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The man who would achieve eminence as a maker of 
foreign policy needs to be in the right place, at the 
right time, with the right issues:
I wish to talk to you today about a 19th century
American who missed this eminence. He occupied a position 
of great power in the United States government. He held 
that position at an important interlude. He advocated 
a policy that by the light of today's events seems
prescient, but nevertheless he has never been accorded 
any particular recognition. Unless I am greatly mistaken, 
he is regarded by few if any of those gathered here today 
as an important figure in the making of the foreign policy 
of the United States.
I speak of Henry Winter Davis, chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House in 1864. Perhaps 
I am mistaken in assuming that he is not widely known 
today among those interested in American foreign policy. 
I wonder how many of you know of his career. You need 
not feel embarrassed. I am sure he would be remembered
by few people even among groups of citizens who are 
students of American foreign policy. No one has ever
2written an adequate biography of him according to the 
Dictionary of American Biography.
Davis was born August 16, 1817. He graduated from
Kenyon College and the law school at the University of 
Virginia and began the practice of law in Alexandria, 
Virginia. He moved to Baltimore in 1849. He began his 
political career in the ill-fated presidential campaign 
of General Winfield Scott, appearing on the platform in 
that campaign with Horace Gr eeJ-jey and Robert Winthrop. 
In 1855 he was elected to Congress, and quickly took a 
place among the leaders of the Know-Nothing Party. He
supported Fillmore in the campaign of 1856. In 1860,
he broke a deadlock over the speakership of the House 
by voting for William Pennington, the Republican candidate 
and enabled the new party to organize the House. He was 
a national figure from that day on. He was regarded as
a strong candidate for the Republican nomination for vice
president. He hoped to be a member of Lincoln's cabinet
but was passed over for Montgomery Blair. On February
7, 1861, he made what many regarded as the greatest speech
of his life when he denounced the doctrine of secession 
and said Maryland would not be dragged from the union.
But on June 13, a southern sympathizer was elected to 
his seat in the House. Meanwhile, Davis called for the
seizure of federal forts in Maryland by the federal 
government. He spoke for the Union throughout the country
3and was re-elected to the House in 1863, and was at once 
made chairman of the Committee on Foreign ’ Affairs. 
In the election which returned Lincoln to the White House, 
Davis again lost his seat in the House. He fought 
Lincoln's reconstruction plans and later he was for the 
impeachment of Johnson. In December of 1865, he returned 
to Washington as a private citizen, and appeared at the 
door of the House, where, says the Dictionary of American 
Biography, "his mere presence broke up the session." 
At the height of his power and popularity, he fell ill 
and he died of pneumonia on December 30.
My attention was called to Davis by a paragraph in 
the Ben;Perley Poore's Reminiscences. Poore was for 60 
years a Washington correspondent who wrote for a great 
many daily newspapers. Poore said that Roger A. Pryor, 
an editorial contributor to the Washington Union, in the 
Spring of 1853, wrote a"scathing review" of a book 
entitled THE WAR OF ORMUZD AND AHRIMAN, by Henry Winter 
Davis of Baltimore, which "set forth the United States 
and Russia as the respective champions of the principles 
of liberty and despotism, and claimed to foresee in the 
distant future a mighty and decisive conflict between 
these persistent combatants." Pryor denounced this 
prophecy and predicted the future would "consolidate and 
perpetuate the friendly relations" between the two
4countries. Poore wrote that "it was the general belief 
in Washington that Pryor had been inspired by someone 
connected with the Russian Legation."
I obtained a copy of the book written in 1852 and 
was struck by its preface, which stated:
"Within the four score years of the life of a man 
two powers have grown from insignificance to the arbiters 
of the world. They occupy separate continents. They 
are actuated by hostile theories of political power. 
In each the principles of its system absolutely pervade 
every department of government, reach into every element 
of state and control the administration of its affairs. 
There is no formally organized opposition to the existing 
order of things. There is no serious difference of 
feeling or opinion among the citizens. The people are 
equally devoted to the form and to the substance of their 
respective constitutions. The foundations of both 
governments firmly rest on the assent of the people who 
are ready to signify that devotion on the field of battle.
"Each is the incarnation of one of the two great 
principles —  power absolutely unchecked and power 
constitutionally controlled and limited -- which have 
always striven and now still strive for the mastery of 
mankind. These two principles are Liberty and Despotism 
-- the Ormuzd and the Ahriman of the political world. Their 
purest incarnations exist in the Republic of America and 
the Empire of Russia."
5In his book, Winters argued that "the European 
Revolution of 1848 is recoiled with disastrous ruin on
the cause of human freedom." The reactionary monarchies 
of Europe, he argued, under the leadership of Metternich
and The Emperor Alexander of Russia, had crushed the 
rebellion and were looking for more conquests. The 
struggle, he said had upset the balance of power in Europe 
in favor of Russia. The dictatorship of Russia, in
Europe, he said, was devoted to "the ruin of all free 
government and is absolutely inconsistent with the 
existence of the English monarchy and the American Republic. 
Winters urged that the only alternatives were war in 
Europe now with allies and war herafter on our own soil 
without allies. He said "Russia's agents flit like demons 
of the night around the skirts of English dominions" and 
"were felt and seen in the Afghan war."
He thought the subjection of Europe permanently to 
any one power would be of serious import to the United 
States. He urged an alliance with England to fight this 
despotism. He was alarmed at the subjection of Poland 
and of Hungary. He thought domestic discord exposed the 
United States to great risks at the hands of a skillfull
enemy. He added:
"Nor are these the only sources of foreign danger. 
We are surrounded by feeble and factious republics —  
the prey of eternal war, delivered over to the horrors
6of civil discord, and the very points an ambitious, active, 
and malicious power would seize on, to annoy us. The 
protection of distance is destroyed when nations at our 
door sufficiently numerous and powerful of themselves 
to harrass if not serious to endanger us, may be stirred
up by foreign irnitriigjUtes , and by foreign money, led by 
European science. We found the invasion of Mexico no
child's play, and from it we may estimate how troublesome
would have been her accession to an armed league in
Europe."
In the turbulent years preceding the Civil War, 
Americans apparently did not pay much attention to the 
dire warnings of Davis. The reactionary leaders of 
Europe, meanwhile, did not press a war to regain their 
former colonies. Ferdinand of Spain had appealed to the
Quintuple Alliance to intervene in South America. Henry 
Steele Commanger said the European regimes had the "good 
sense" not to try to turn back the revolutions in the 
Western Hemisphere, much as they hated them. Ferdinand 
Scheveill in his history of Europe, said "the co-ordinated 
action" of England and the United States, "ended all 
further talk on the part of the European champions of 
absolutism to interfere in the affairs of the western 
continent."
Alexander of Russia, far from seeking profit in 
American discord, sent the Russian fleet to New York to
7show his support for President Lincoln and the Union. 
The fleet, including the Almax, dropped anchors in New 
York harbor and stayed from October 1863 to April 1864.
On board the Almax was Rims ky-Korsakov, the great Russian 
composer and friend of Moussorgsky, who finished Boris 
Gudinov while on duty as a Russian Naval officer.
Moreover, Russia in 1854, on the outbreak of the Crimean
War, believed her Alaskan territory in danger and
proposed selling it to the United States. A treaty was 
concluded in 1867 making Alaska U.S. territory for 
$7,200,000.
So the threat feared by Congressman Davis was eclipsed 
by domestic war and, at least temporarily removed, by 
the collapse of the menace of the Quintuple Alliance, 
and made more implausible by the friendly gestures of 
the Russian Empire.
Now Congressman Davis, a century later, has events 
on his side again. The government that has succeeded 
the Russian Empire of the Czars is once again in the 
center of Europe. Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing in his 
recent book, again sees a Russian Menace. He says: "The 
distinctive character of the Russian Imperial drive is 
derived from the interconnection between the militaristic 
organization of the Russian society and the territorial 
imperative that defines its instinct for survival. As 
often noted by both Russian and non-Russian historians, 
from time immemorial, Russian society expressed itself 
politically through a state that was mobilized and
8regimented along military lines, with the security 
dimension serving as the central organization impulse. 
The absence of any clearly definable national boundary 
made territorial expansion the obvious way of ensuring 
security. Such expansion bred new conflicts, new threats 
and a further expansionary drive. A relentless historical 
cycle was thus set in motion: insecurity, in turn fueled 
further expansionism."
Alexander Solzhenitsyn now outdoes Henry Winter Davis, 
attributing the menace not to the Russian character but 
to Communism. He wrote in 1980:
"Two mistakes are especially common (in dealing with 
Soviet affairs). One is the failure to understand the 
radical hostility of communism to mankind as a whole - 
the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, 
that there exist no 'better’ variants of communism; that 
it is incapable of growing 'kinder,' that it cannot 
survive as an ideology without using terror, and that, 
consequently, to coexist with communism on the same planet 
is impossible. Either it will spread, cancer-like, to 
destroy mankind, or else mankind will have to rid itself 
of communism (even then face lengthy treatment for 
secondary tumors). The second and equally prevalent error 
is to assume an indisoluable link between the universal 
disease of communism and the country where it first siezed
9control -- Russia. This error skews one’s perception 
of the threat and cripples attempts to respond sensibly 
to it, thus leaving the West disarmed."
Henry Winter Davis was born a hundred years too soon 
to lead the West against the Soviet Union -- he was not 
on the scene at the right time. He was not in the right 
place either -- the chairman of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs does not often greatly influence foreign 
policy. Davis was in the right pew, but in the wrong 
church -- he should have been Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the Senate, where he might have
had more leverage. Did he have the right issue (a hundred 
years too soon)? At least he anticipated some of the 
measures with which his successors have tried to meet 
that issue. He was a precursor of the late Clarence 
Streit, in advocating Union Now with the enemies of
Russia. He thought in terms of an alliance like NATO.
He perceived that unstable governments in South America 
would form a platform for subversion and attack on the 
United States.
Perhaps when he died he was open to a reproach seldom 
justly visited upon American statesmen: He looked too
far ahead.
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